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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TilE

~TATE

OF UTAII,
Plaintiff and UesJHillrlent,
ca~e ~ o.

-vs..T .\ ~~~~~~ B.

9920

DE~X LS,

Deffndant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
~TA'I'E~II~Xrr

OF KIND OF CASE

The appellant appeals from a conviction 1n the
Fourth Di~trict Court, Utah County, of the cri1ne of
forg-Pry in violation of Section 76-:26-7, r.c.A. 1953.
DI~PO~ITIOX

IX LO\VER COURT

The appellant pled not guilty to the information
charging hin1 with the crime of forgery, and upon jury
trial before the Honorable :Maurice Harding, Judge, on
March 1:1. 1963, the appellant was found guilty and committed to the State Prison.

RELIEF SOUGHT OX APPEAL
The re~pondent submits the decision of the trial
court ~hould be affirmed.
1
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STATEI\IENT OF FACTS
The respondent submits the following statement of
facts as being in keeping with the rule that in reviewing
a conviction the record will be reviewed in a light most
favorable to the conviction and, also, being more in keeping with the actual evidence before the jury.
On or about December 7, 1962, the appellant entered
Curley's Market in Provo, Utah (R. 7) where he presented Exhibit 1 to Clayton F. Black, the son of the pro~
prietor. (R. 7, 8). Exhibit 1 is an instrument purporting
to be a cheak drawn upon the Walker Bank and Trust
Company, Farmers and Merchants Branch, Provo, Utah,
by Mrs. Billie Stubbs, and payable in the sum of $54.31.
The check was dated December 7, 1962, and bore the
notation "Labor." Mr. Black initialed the check, and the
cashier gave the appellant the money. (R. 8).
Mrs. Billie Stubbs testified that it was not her
signature on Exhibit 1, although it bore her name.
(R. 11, 12). She also testified that she did not give the
appellant permission or authority to sign her name (R.
12), nor did she authorize anyone else to sign her name
to a check for the appellant. (R.13).
LeGrand J. Barker, Lieutenant of Detectives of the
Provo Police Department, had conversation with the
appellant on February 11, 1963. He testified, (R. 15):
"A.

Jimmie came into the Police Department and
said that Billie Stubbs was going to sign a
2
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romplaint, unless he could get the 1noney for
these checks that he had written, before the
bank opened that Inorning, and he gave me a
statement regarding this check.

Q. I am speaking of this particular check, l\Ir.
Baker, the check which is Fifty-four Dollars
and son1e odd cents drawn on the Walker
Bank.
Did he 1nake any comment regarding that?
A.

Yes.

Q. \Yhat did he say regarding that?
A. HP said that he had made out the check and
signed the name of Mrs. Billie Stubbs.

Q. Did he say anything else regarding it?
A.

That he didn't have authority from her to
sign the check."

The appellant, upon voluntarily taking the stand,.
that on December 8, 1963, he signed Mrs. Billie
~tubbs' name on the ~heck, Exhibit 1, which he cashed
at Curley's :Jiarket. (R. 16, 18). He never made any claim
that he had authority to sign checks, or that he expected
the check to be allowed by Mrs. Stubbs. Mrs. Stubbs
never indicated that she gave the appellant authority to
sign her name, in fact, she testified to the exact opposite.
tP~tified

(R.l2).

Xo other evidence of any kind tending to exculpate
the aceused was offered.
3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGU:MENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW A
JURY TO CONVICT THE APPELLANT BEYOND ALL
REASONABLE DOUBT.

The appellant was convicted of the crime of forgery,
and contends the evidence in support of his conviction
is insufficient. The appellants raises several inferences
to support his contention. First, he contends that no
complaint or objection from Mrs. Stubbs to the signing
of the check by the appellant was made after the fact
until the complaint was signed in February. This is
after the fact and immaterial. The time when Mrs.
Stubbs received notice of the check having been forged
does not appear of record. 1 Additionally, there is no
evidence of record that ~Irs. Stubbs did "ratify" the
defendant's action, or did or intended to do any of the
things that appellant sets out in his brief.
The evidence which actually does appear of record
is that the appellant made out Exhibit 1, and did so
without the authority of Mrs. Billie Stubbs, whose name
he affixed to the check as drawer; that he cashed the
check, that he offered no excuse or evidence of any past
conduct that would allow him to expect that his employer
would have sanctioned such conduct. No evidence of
record appears that she did sanction the conduct. Finally,
the appellant admitted the act, and admitted the absence
1. No evidence of record supports the appellant's assertion
that the check was received in January, even so one months'
time between return and the filing of the complaint in February
is relatively fast action.

4
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of uny authority at the tiine of the ad which would allow

his ad ions or ta('itly give t ht>m approval. A mere hope
of :-;uhsPtpa·nt ratification is insufficient to exculpate.
'ftwrP is no evidence that the appellant thought he had
nutho ri t y to sign his e1nployer's nmne to a check in his
be halt', or had in the past been given any reason that
would lead hiin so to believe. The actual evidence of
record is ru:nply sufficient to convict.
Jn 0tatc r. T.inuin, 64 Utah 579, 232 Pac. 543 (1925),
the P\·idt-nep showed a silnilar course of conduct, but
without the direct admissions of the defendant. The
court held the evidence to be amply sufficient to sustain
n conviction. The evidence is, therefore, amply sufficient
in this case .
.\s to the appellant's claim of ratification, he has
no legal basis for his contention. The general rule is
found in Clark and 1\Iarshall Crimes, 6th Ed., Sec. 12.32 :
"To constitute forgery, a fraudulent intent
is ahn1ys essential. There must not only be a false
making of an instrument, but it must be with intent to defraud. It follows that a person is not
guilty of forgery in signing another's name to a
note or other instrument, if he believes that he has
authority to do so, though he may in fact have no
authority. If there is no such authority, however,
and no belief that there is, one who signs another's nmne to an instrument is none the less
guilty of forgery because he believes that the person whose name he signs will ratify his act and
pay the obligation. * * *"
The appellant did not ever indicate that he thought
he had authority to execute the check, in fact he admitSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ted to the contrary. There was not one scintilla of evidence that appellant had a "reasonable and honest"
belief that he had authority to execute the instrument.
Nor would subsequent hope of ratification obviate the
offense, or even subsequent ratification had that occurred. Tho1nas v. State, 33 S.\V. 127 (Tex. Crim. App.
1895). In State v. Tull, 119 Mo. 421, 24 S.W. 1010 (1893),
the court stated the general rule :
"The fact that one whose name had been
forged may be willing to condone the offense, and
even pay the obligation, does not render it less a
cri1ne in the forger."
See also People v. Weaver, 177 N.Y. 434, 69 N.E.
1094 ( 1904), where a claim similar to the instant one was
rejected by the New Y ol'lk Court of Appeals on the
grounds that mere hope of ratification does not destroy
the necessary intent to defraud. Of a similar conclusion
is Foster v. St,ate, 65 Tex. Cr. 143, 143 S.\V. 623 (1912).
vVharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 2, p. 437,
notes:
"It is no defense that the accused believed
that the person whose name he had forged to
the instrument would pay the amount thereof, or
that there was condonation by subsequent ratification and willingness to pay, on the part of the
person whose name was forged, or intent to repay, or actual repayment, or ratification of the
instrument."
See also 37 C.J.S., Forgery, Sec. 89.
Consequently, there is no merit to appellant's contention as to the sufficiency of the evidence.
6
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POINT II.

THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO
ORDER A MISTRIAL AFTER APPELLANT'S OPENING
ARGUMENT.
Tlw appellant's second point urges that the actions

of tlw trial defense counsel in making his opening argument to the jury Wl're so prejudicial to the accused that
the tr.ial court should have sua sponte granted a mistrial.
Tlw opening argument of the defense counsel was a short
response to the proof the prosecution outlined in its
opening argument. The opening statement of the defense, which appellant now, for the first time on appeal
finds objectionable, was as follows in its pertinent parts,
(R. 5):
~'Now, the defendant will be called to testify,
and he will admit that he did. He will say that he
did. He signed a confession that he did, but he
didn't. He didn't put that name on that check; he
didn't forge it. And I want you to watch him very
carefully when he testifies and says that he did.

Now the prosecution will ask the defendant if
he has ever been convicted of a felony-and this is
a felony-and he will answer yes, that he had. The
prosecution will ask him that question to show
that his testimony is unworthy of belief, that you
can't believe him as to whether or not he is testifying to the truth, because he has already committed
a serious crime. And under our law the Court will
instruct you that you can disregard his testimony
if you don't believe he is telling the truth, because
he has been eonvicted of a felony once, and this
casts a cloud upon his ability to tell the truth.

Xow, this is the substance of our case. The defendant didn't hire me to represent him to plead
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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not guilty. The defendant doesn't want this trial·
he wanted to plead guilty to this charge. He ha~
already admitted to the police that he is guilty to
this charge, and he is going to tell you that he is
guilty. But he is not guilty. And I want you to
watch him when he testifies, because he didn't do
it. He didn't forge that check. That is our case."
The argument in no way discloses any disloyalty or
conflicting motives on the part of defense counsel. He
insists in the innocence of his client. Although he admits
that the evidence will disclose a confession of guilt, he,
in good concience, urges the jury to find his client innocent.
The appellant's argument is, in effect, that the trial
defense counsel was guilty of such misconduct as would
compel the trial judge to order a new trial. Essentially
the argument of appellant is based on two occurrences
in the opening argument. First, the fact that he, defense
counsel, mentioned the appellant's previous conviction,
and, second, that he commented on his client's confession
of guilt and feelings of guilt.
The general rule as to when a conviction is improper
because of impropriety on the part of the defense counsel
is set out in 74 ALR 2d 1403:
"* * * most courts considering * * * the question of incompetency of retained counsel are generally agreed that the judgment of conviction
is void when counsel's representation has been so
inadequate as to make the trial a farce and
1nockery of justice, thereby denying the accused
a fair trial (due process of law)***."

8
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ThP :\t>vada Supreme Court :-;tatPd it a:; follows in
,'-.'lttte v. J11kl'ch. 49 ~Pv. :217, :2-±:2 Pac. 590 (19:26):

.. \Ve think that the rule deducible frmn the
is that a new trial should not be granted
hy an appellate court in a criminal case on account
of the i twom pt>h.'IH'~r or neglect of counsel, unless
it i:-; so gn'at that the defendant is prejudiced and
thereby deprived of a fair trial."

('a~P~

Thus the trial n1ust be of such a low character as to
rPnder the trial a "farce and a mockery." People v.
Durpee, 156 Cal. App.. 2d 60, 319 P.2d 39.

It is submitted that the defense in this instance,
although some may say it could have been done better,
was not a "mockery of justice" so as to warrant reversal.
See Annotations 24 ALR 1022 ; 64 ALR 437.
In State v. Farnsworth, 13 U.2d 103, 368 P.2d 914
(1962), this court was faced with similar claim of im-

proper defense. It noted:
"'Vith respect to the first alleged error, defendant argues that his trial counsel was incompetent and did not effectively represent him, thus
depriving him of the right to counsel guaranteed
by the State and Federal Constitutions. Const.
art. 1, § 1:2; U.S. Const. Amend. 14. To support
such a eontention, he cites the facts that trial
counsPl waived preliminary hearing, ·waived a
jury, made no opening statement, failed to make
objections to introduction of evidence, did not
cross-examine but one of the State's witnesses,
ete. The privilege of an accused to the assistance
9
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of counsel is a fundamental right which means a
right to a reputable n1ember of the bar who is
willing and in a position to honestly and conscientiously represent his interests.
In the instant case, the defendant selected
and retained the trial counsel \Yho is a member of
long standing of the bar, experienced in trial
work, both civil and criminal, and esteemed bv the
bar and judiciary alike for his ability and integrity. The serious charges in respect to this
attorney's competency should not be lightly treated. Suffice it to say, we have examined the record
closely and cannot say, upon retrospect, that trial
counsel did not, under the circumstances of the
case against the defendant, fairly and competently represent him. The record indicates that no action or inaetion by the trial attorney which could
not rationally find explanation in a legitimate
exercise of strategy-particularly when the case
was tried before a judge wi~thout a jury."
The factual situation in Farnsworth is certainly
more aggravated than that in the instant case. Mere
errors of judgment on the part of defense counsel are
not sufficient to warran~t reversal because of trial error.
llfandell v. People, 76 Colo. 296, 231 Pac. 199 (1924);
Meaders v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 437, 278 S.\Y. 215
(1925); 7-± ALR 2d 1399. Indeed, that is all the appellate counsel, in substance, offers, that if he had tried
the case below he would have proceeded differently. In
his brief, appellant urges a plea of guilty should have
been entered. (Brief, p. 19). This would not have effected the ultimate result of conviction. An analysis of
the claims of in1proper action attendant to the opening

10
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urgmnent demonstrates only that trial counsel was einploying good strategy and proper ethics .
.\ppellant's contention that it was improper for defen:-;p counsel to 1nention the previous felony conviction
i:-; at best a make-weight argmnent. The appellant intended to ta:ke the stand and defense counsel obviously
knew that if he did so he would be subject to crossexamination as to any previous felony convictions, including the type and nu1nber. State v. Dickson, 12 U.2d
"· 361 P.:2d ±12 (1961); State v. Kazda, 1± U.2d ------, 382
P.:2d 407 (1963). 2 Rather than leave this disclosure to
the cross-examination of the prosecutor with its telling
eff{\et, it is good trial strategy to bring the matter out on
din•et examination or opening argu1nent. This acquaints
the jury with the faet and allows them to adjust to it
before the presentation of defendant's case. Further, it
reliPn's the appearance that something is being held
hack. Rothblatt, Successful Techniques in the Trial of
Criminal Cases, p. 8±, so recommends:
"If your client has a criminal record includmg a conviction or a number of convictions, it
2. State v. Kazda, supra: "Also assigned as error in the
cross-examination of the defendant as to prior convictions. It
was elicited upon cross-examination that the defendant had
several prior felony convictions, unrelated to the instant charge,
and he maintains that this amounted to a general assault upon
his character and thus constituted prejudicia1 error. This is
also without merit. When an accused voluntarily takes the witness stand he may be asked whether or not he has ever been
convicted of a felony. Such a question is sanctioned by statute.
If the accused answers in the affirmative, he may be asked the
nature of the felony. Further, the accused may be asked if he
has been convicted of more than one felony, and if so, the type
or nature thereof."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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will sound Inuch better if he tells about it himself
in the direct examination. This takes the sting out
of it and prevents the prosecutor from bringing
it out-it sounds much worse coming from his
mouth on cross-examination. Such an open approach also gives you the opportunity to excuse or
explain it in the most satisfactory way. * * *"
In Levin, Evidence, 1961 .Annual Survey of .American
Law, p. 502,517 (1962), it is noted:
".A prosecutor who is obliged to offer a witness with an unhappy criminal record may consider it good tactics to anticipate the inevitable
attack and himself elicit from the witness the
evidence of prior convictions. Superficially this
may be characterized as an attempt to impeach
one's own witness. ***"
In State v. Holley, 34 N.J. 9, 166 .A.2d 758, cert. denied 368 U.S. 854 (1961), the New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized this as good trial strategy and upheld it
against an argument that it is an attempt to impeach
one's own witness. It was, therefore, good and proper
strategy for defenese counsel to bring this before the
jury, 3 and no claim of error or impropriety can be found
from such action.
Finally, the appellant urges that it was improper
for the trial defense counsel to indicate to the jury that
3. See State v. Cude, No. 9619, Ju'ly 2, 1963, where the same
thing was done by trial defense counsel and the prosecutor
thereafter cross-examined on the nature and number of the
convictions (appellant's Brief). The court said: "We find no
merit to defendant's assignment of error relating to the crossexamination with respect to his felony record."

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tlw appellant ('On~idered himself guilty, and that he had
(·ont'"~~l'd to the <'l'iine, and that the prosecution would
pn·:-;Pnt Pvidence showing that he signed his e1nployer's
rutmP to Exhibit 1 without proper authority. In this
rP~lK'rt defpnse coun:-;el \nts doing no more than putting
before tlw jury the same thing which the prosecution
hnd indicated would be proved, but he did so with the
additional qualifieation and assertion that he did not
l)(llit>VP the defendant was guilty or that he had executed
t•:xh.ibit 1. He professed faith in the defendant's innoCl'IH'l' and, therefore, left with the jury a doubt as to
wht>ther they were receiving the full picture in the case.
Det'Pn~P counsel cannot be expected to lie to the jury or
to raise issues of defense which are not legally and ethically proper. When presented with a case of an accused's
guilt whieh seems to be supported by overwhelming evilh'n<'e, including a confession, defense counsel has little
altPrnative but to ask the jury to watch the demeanor of
the accused and to weigh the circumstances carefully
in their minds. There is no duty on the part of defense
counsel to plead a man guilty, especially where he has an
abiding faith in his innocence or feels that the true facts
of the case are being kept from him. Even if the evidence
i~ overwhelming, an accused has a right to test the prosecution in its proof. That right includes the prerogative
of ~itting baek and offering no affirmative defense where
none is available and testing the strength of the prosecution'8 case.
In Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (1955),
tl1e court was faced with the claim of incompetent defense counsel. In rejecting the contention, the court

13
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took note of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. In
doing so it said:

"* * * However, when the question of incompetency of counsel is called into question hv
the petitioner, the question of guilt must be co~
sidered by us for the reason that if defendant
was conelusively guilty the question as to just
what his counsel could do by way of defense is important."
Certainly defense counsel could not be expected to manufacture evidence, place perjury before the jury, or induce
his client to say what his client was unwilling to say.
Ccmsequently, defense counsel could do nothing but attempt to take the sting of the prosecution's evidence out
of the minds of the jury and the court and see that the
evidence was sufficient to prove the crime charged.
In the instant case, the defense counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses as to the identity of the defendant and endeavored to elicit evidence, although inadmissible, as to the opinion of the appellant's employer
as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. There
is nothing in the record, including the opening statement
of defense counsel, that even approximates infidelity to
his client, let alone amounting to a sham or mockery of
justice. Consequently, there can he no claim that defense counsel's conduct entitles the appellant to a new
trial. People v. Durpee, 156 Cal. App. 2d 60, 319 P.2d 39.

14
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CONCLUSION
It i~ submitted that the guilt of the appellant was
proved in the trial court by overwhelming evidence. To
afford the appellant a new trial in the face of arguments
which, though ingenious, are unmeritorious, would waste
the time of the courts, the appellant and the prosooutors
and add nothing to justice.
This court should affirm.

Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER
Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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